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Abstract
Ensuring access to clean water is one of the most important development and health challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Given the manifold impacts of business activities on water resources, corporate water actions should be of central concern 
to business ethics researchers. Yet so far we know too little about whether business activities that impact on water resources 
are noticed or how corporate water actions are valued by a firm’s stakeholders, including by financial markets. In response, 
we conduct an event study to investigate the shareholder wealth effect of reports of corporate water actions. We explore 
stock market reactions to water actions by S&P 500 firms from 2005 to 2017, showing that the market reacts positively to 
reports of responsible water actions and negatively to irresponsible actions. We further explain that these abnormal returns to 
water actions are associated with a firm’s past performance on ethical issues, arguing that the reputational effects from prior 
corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility influence market reactions. Our analysis provides evidence that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to responsible water actions for firms with records of past responsibility and an offsetting effect 
for those with past irresponsibility. Similarly, we demonstrate an insurance effect that limits punishment for irresponsible 
water actions for firms with responsible performance records and diminishing negative marginal returns for those already 
seen to be irresponsible. This study is the first to show that shareholders recognize market value in corporate water actions 
and are prepared to award or punish firms in stock markets based on their impacts on water.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility/irresponsibility (CSR/CSiR) · Water · Financial returns · Shareholder wealth 
effect
Introduction
By 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or 
regions with absolute water scarcity, posing risks for energy 
production, food security, human health, economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction (UN-Water, 2020). By 2030, 
water supplies are predicted to satisfy only 60% of global 
demand on average (Boccaletti et al., 2009), raising ethical 
questions about the unequal distribution of water stress. 
While business activities in the developed world are respon-
sible for many drivers of climate change and other factors 
subsequently leading to water problems (Dong et al., 2019; 
IPCC, 2018), many of the impacts manifest in the developing 
world, which have lower capacity, structure, and resources to 
deal with the problem (UN-Water, 2020). Thus, researchers 
in this area identify “valuing water” as one of the most criti-
cal steps toward achieving water sustainability, including the 
value of human right to water as well as economic valuation 
(Garrick et al., 2017).
However, it is difficult to quantify the value of water and 
there is no consensus on how to measure it. As one of the 
biggest users of fresh water and with manifold impacts of 
business activities on water resources (UN-Water, 2020), 
business organizations have a big role to play in manag-
ing the environmental, social, and ethical impacts of water. 
But corporate water actions are difficult to motivate without 
valuing their impacts. With increasing awareness, a growing 
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number of institutional investors (CDP, 2016) and varied 
stakeholder base (Bowen et al., 2018; Lambooy, 2011) today 
demand that business organizations carefully control and 
minimize pollution, water resource consumption and deple-
tion, and other water impacts of business activities (Bowen 
et al., 2018; Lambooy, 2011). Initial estimates suggest that 
the social and environmental cost of global business water 
use add up to around $1.9 trillion per year and some of these 
external costs have already started being internalized and 
hitting firm bottom lines (Trucost, 2013). Internalizing water 
risks could have serious impacts on corporate growth, mar-
ket valuation, corporate creditworthiness, and bond rating 
(Burritt et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2012).
Despite all these arguments, the fact remains that water is 
not usually a directly traded asset like oil, and tends to be an 
underpriced resource with mostly unrestricted access (Tru-
cost, 2013). This has led to calls for research to add mon-
etary or financial data to measure the impacts of corporate 
water actions and making this ethical issue more tangible 
for firms. Evaluating the financial impact of corporate water 
actions has barely been touched on yet, with most of the 
research focus concentrating on physical water use (Christ 
& Burritt, 2017). Empirical work from the field of water 
is limited (Kurland & Zell, 2010; Whiteman et al., 2013). 
Business ethics approaches to water management have pri-
marily adopted case studies or other qualitative approaches, 
mostly analyzing the extent and quality of water disclosure 
by firms (Burritt et al., 2016; Kleinman et al., 2017; Leong 
et al., 2014; Linneman et al., 2015; Money, 2014). A few 
quantitative studies have explored the quantity of water used 
(Jeswani & Azapagic, 2011), water footprint assessment 
(Hoekstra et al., 2016), and water management accounting 
(Christ & Burritt, 2017). To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no prior large sample empirical research to systematically 
investigate the direct financial impacts brought about by 
firms’ responsible or irresponsible water actions.
Extant literature already indicates a positive relationship 
between corporate social responsibility (CSR) in general and 
corporate financial performance (Friede et al., 2015; Mar-
golis & Walsh, 2003; Margolis et al., 2009; Orlitzky et al., 
2003). We extend the same logics in the specific ethical issue 
of access to water, expecting corporate water actions to ass-
coiate positively to corporate financial performance given 
the potentially significant implications for business risk and 
return. We specifically focus on the shareholder wealth effect 
in the uncharted territory of corporate water actions. We take 
a sample of S&P 500 firms during 2005 to 2017 and manu-
ally construct a sample of responsible and irresponsible water 
actions by these firms as published in leading news outlets. We 
follow an event study approach and investigate if these firms 
experience any abnormal returns following the release of new 
information regarding water actions. Our findings provide the 
first evidence that shareholders recognize value in corporate 
water actions: the market reacts positively to responsible water 
actions, and negatively to irresponsible water actions by firms.
Establishing this shareholder wealth effect of corporate 
water actions is extremely important as one of the main prob-
lems in the field of water is that the value of this resource 
and related actions are not clearly visible, which can dampen 
business incentives (Trucost, 2013). Our study of stock market 
reactions would help practitioners and policy-makers under-
stand investor sentiment and their evaluation of water actions 
in this new business ethics domain. Since water assets are 
overexploited and undervalued in many countries, establishing 
financial market consequences from corporate water actions 
could help raise awareness of this emerging business ethics 
issue and ultimately support the protection and fairer distribu-
tion of water resources.
We also explore what prior factors influence these mar-
ket reactions to water actions and propose that these actions 
are interpreted by shareholders within the broader context of 
prior overall corporate social responsibility (CSR) and cor-
porate social irresponsibility (CSiR) performance by firms. 
We propose a matrix relating a firm’s CSR and CSiR perfor-
mance to the abnormal returns from subsequent responsible 
and irresponsible water actions. Specifically, when a firm with 
prior responsible performance engages in a further responsible 
action, it experiences diminishing positive marginal returns. 
This suggests that the returns to responsible actions increase 
at a decreasing rate because of growing market expectations 
and indifference. A similar market indifference effect manifests 
when prior irresponsible performance is followed by a further 
irresponsible action, and we term the effect as diminishing 
negative marginal returns. However, the market provides toler-
ance through a less negative reaction whenever prior respon-
sible performance is followed by an irresponsible action, in 
which case prior positive responsibility provides an insurance 
effect. In a similar spirit, the market shows encouragement 
when prior irresponsibility is followed by a responsible action, 
a form of offsetting present for past performance.
We provide detailed conceptual framework behind each 
of these four proposed effects in the next section on theory 
and hypotheses, followed by section on data and method-
ology. We then go on to provide evidence in favor of all 
our hypotheses, and we conclude with the theoretical and 
practical implications of our findings in the final discussion 
section.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
Investor Reaction to Responsible and Irresponsible 
Corporate Water Actions
As with many ethical issues affecting businesses, water 
issues can be expected to affect corporate financial 
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performance through impacting profit potential and cor-
porate risk profiles. The World Economic Forum has 
ranked water crises as the second most severe risk that 
the business community faces in terms of impact (Howell, 
2013). What makes water risk so critical is that it is not 
just a subset of environmental concern, but also a critical 
resource for carrying out business (Money, 2014). Burton 
(2010) separated water risk into four components: physi-
cal, reputational, regulatory and litigation risk. Similarly, 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(2012) grouped business threats related to water into five 
main groups: financial, resulting from increasing inves-
tor awareness and preference that may lead to restricted 
access to capital, higher interest rates, etc.; operational, 
resulting from increase in production costs and disruptions 
because of lack in smooth supply of water resources; prod-
uct, resulting from loss of customers because of increasing 
awareness and preference against water unfriendly prod-
ucts and companies; reputational, resulting from nega-
tive impacts on communities or society owing to business 
water-related actions; and regulatory, resulting from fees, 
fines and lawsuits resulting in regulation violations. A 
2012 report by Trucost has claimed that external costs 
of water have started hitting the bottom lines of firms. 
A number of stakeholders—including suppliers, inves-
tors, rating agencies, creditors, customers, communities, 
government, regulatory agencies, and NGOs, have started 
to take interest in water-related actions and disclosure by 
firms (Burritt et al., 2016), and firms can be expected to be 
rewarded or punished accordingly by financial markets for 
their responsible and irresponsible water actions.
Our baseline hypothesis, consistent with previous stud-
ies on market reactions to CSR events (e.g., Flammer, 
2013; Hamilton, 1995; Konar & Cohen, 1997; Kruger, 
2015), is that shareholders associate responsible water 
actions with better risk management and potential returns. 
For example, due to responsible water actions, the firm 
might gain greater profitability arising from lower pro-
duction costs and/or higher sales to a more committed 
customer base. From a risk perspective, responsible water 
actions might strengthen creditors’ confidence in the firm’s 
future potential, allowing the firm better access to creditor 
capital and/or more favorable rates, reducing the finan-
cial risk. Consequently, shareholders are expected to react 
positively to responsible water actions. This prediction has 
been supported in a variety of ethical business contexts, 
but no previous study examines how the market reacts to 
corporate water action announcements in particular. We 
summarize our first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) Shareholders react positively to the 
announcement of a responsible water action.
On the contrary, an irresponsible water action, for exam-
ple, water pollution, can lead to loss in reputation, brand 
equity, employee morale, and customer loyalty, and cause 
other forms of negative effects on stakeholders. Further-
more, legal costs might be involved. All of these imply an 
induced competitive disadvantage to a firm. Therefore, we 
predict a negative reaction from the stock market to irrespon-
sible water actions:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Shareholders react negatively to the 
announcement of an irresponsible water action.
The Effects of Past Responsible or Irresponsible 
Performance
There is an important theoretical distinction between CSR 
actions, that is individual acts of CSR, and corporate social 
performance, that is an aggregation of all CSR actions by 
a firm over a period that provides a measure of the firm’s 
CSR performance over that period (Barnett, 2007). Barnett 
(2007) pointed out that most papers use these CSR action 
and performance terms interchangeably, and that the major-
ity of the studies trying to establish the financial impacts of 
CSR actions have actually worked with CSR performance 
captured through some periodic measure. In this study, we 
recognize and accommodate this difference between individ-
ual responsible or irresponsible actions and the prior positive 
or negative responsibility performance of a firm. We define 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a firm’s compre-
hensive approach to ethical issues delivering economic, 
social, and environmental good to stakeholders, and corpo-
rate social irresponsibility (CSiR) as a firm’s actions causing 
harm or damaging welfare across these parameters (Riera 
& Iborra, 2017; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). We propose that 
performance measures based on the prior accumulation of 
CSR/CSiR actions by a firm help create positive/negative 
reputation that can influence the way the market reacts to 
a subsequent CSR or CSiR action by the firm. This is in 
accordance with Barnett’s (2007) proposition that “stake-
holders draw from their prior knowledge of a firm when they 
assess the implications of new information generated by that 
firm’s CSR activities” (p. 803).
Based on a firm’s responsible and/or irresponsible past 
CSR performance, stakeholders form distinctive percep-
tions about the firm (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Stakehold-
ers can be expected to act on this perception in allocating 
their resources and shaping their relationship with the firm. 
This perception by stakeholders has been identified as an 
important component of firm reputation (Fombrun & Shan-
ley, 1990; Fombrun et al., 2000; Rindova et al., 2005), and 
CSR investment in different stakeholder areas has been con-
sidered as a form of reputation building and maintenance 
activity (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Mahon & Wartick, 
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2003; McWilliams et al., 2006). Therefore, we propose that 
whenever a new CSR or CSiR action by a firm takes place, 
shareholders evaluate the action in the light of firm reputa-
tion set by prior CSR/CSiR performance and market reaction 
is toned accordingly. The reputation created through prior 
CSR/CSiR performance moderates the way the market reacts 
to a subsequent CSR/CSiR action.
In order to understand these moderating effects in full, 
it is very important not to conflate the positive (CSR) and 
negative (CSiR) performance of firms into a composite 
measure, but rather maintain positive and negative perfor-
mance as separate and independent constructs. Eckert (2017) 
placed negative reputation as a separate parallel construct 
to positive reputation, and established that prior good per-
formance and prior bad performance across different stake-
holder domains (customer, investor, regulator, supplier) can 
work as indicators of good and bad reputation. Mattingly 
and Berman (2006) provided evidence that good and bad 
CSR performance are not the natural reciprocals of each 
other but rather are two conceptually distinct and empirically 
independent constructs that should not be aggregated. Bad 
CSR performance does not imply the absence of prior good 
actions, but rather signals the presence of prior unethical 
or harmful actions. A firm may have positive performance 
across some parameters, but negative performance in oth-
ers, even from the same CSR domain (Walker, 2010). For 
exmaple, in the CSR domain of environment, a firm may 
have positive reputation for controlling its carbon footrpint, 
but a negative reputation for water contamination.
Prior CSR performance can indicate a good reputation 
arising from CSR and underpin “reputational capital” (Fom-
brun et al., 2000) or “moral capital” (Godfrey, 2005) as a 
strategic asset for the firm. We take this idea forward and 
propose, just as CSR performance can be a strategic asset, 
prior CSiR performance can be a strategic liability and cre-
ate negative reputation. Along similar lines, other papers 
have theorized that negative CSR performance can damage 
firm reputation (Eckert, 2017; Sirsly & Lvina, 2019), term-
ing this as “reputational risk” or “reputational loss”, which 
can be defined as negative perceptions by a firm’s stakehold-
ers causing a change in their behavior that can potentially 
lead to financial loss by the firm (Eckert, 2017; Gatzert, 
2015; Shiu & Yang, 2017). We draw these streams on posi-
tive and negative reputation together, and propose that these 
CSR/CSiR-related positive/negative reputations run parallel 
for a firm, with separate influences on the way the market 
reacts to a subsequent CSR/CSiR action and varying extents 
of financial gain and loss.
Contemporary research has explored the effects of posi-
tive CSR reputation in a variety of CSR domains beyond 
water (Lii & Lee, 2011; Godfrey et al., 2009; Pirsch et al., 
2007; Fombrun et al., 2000). For example, Muthuri et al. 
(2009) showed that employee involvement in community 
programs enhances a firm’s reputation among all stakehold-
ers. Lijun et al. (2014) demonstrated that charitable dona-
tions by firms enhance its goodwill among suppliers. The 
most important effect of positive CSR reputation is perhaps 
the insurance-like benefit it provides in case of a subse-
quent negative event faced by a firm. Godfrey et al. (2009) 
provided evidence supporting an insurance effect for insti-
tutional CSR from the fields of diversity and community. 
Similar evidence has been revealed in other CSR areas (for 
example, Shui and Yang, 2017; Minor & Morgan, 2011; 
Peloza, 2006). However, effects of negative reputation from 
prior irresponsible performance have received much less 
attention (Lange & Washburn, 2012).
Our study completes these studies by simultaneously test-
ing the effects of prior positive and negative CSR perfor-
mance. We introduce a two-by-two matrix to summarize the 
four effects of prior CSR and CSiR performance on market 
reaction to a subsequent responsible or irresponsible water 
action, as shown in Table 1, using the positive/negative repu-
tation created through prior CSR/CSiR performance to help 
explain these associations. Past responsible performance 
can support positive reactions to responsible water actions 
at a diminishing rate (H3), and also provide an insurance 
effect in the case of irresponsible actions (H4). In contrast, 
past irresponsible performance can be offset by subsequent 
responsible actions (H5) that stimulate positive market reac-
tions, and the negative market reactions to irresponsible 
actions are diminished by conformity with expectations set 
by prior irresponsible performance (H6). Details of each 
Table 1  Effects of past 
performance on market reaction 
to corporate water actions
Market reaction to responsible water 
actions











Offsetting effect (H5) Diminishing negative 
returns (H6)
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effect proposed in our matrix and corresponding hypothesis 
are provided in the next section.
Prior Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR) performance
When a firm with a prior record of CSR performance 
engages in one more responsible action, it adds to the firm’s 
existing base of reputational capital. However, this addition 
happens at a diminishing rate. The neo-classical principle 
of diminishing marginal returns for productive assets like 
financial capital or labor, can also be expected to apply in 
case of the reputational capital of CSR. Diminishing return 
is the decrease in the marginal output (not total output) as 
the amount of a single resource input increases, while all 
other inputs stay constant (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2001). 
In the case of CSR, this would mean that if a firm keeps 
investing in CSR, the marginal benefit from one additional 
CSR activity will keep decreasing. High CSR performance 
increases stakeholder expectations (Burgoon and LaPoire, 
1993) and so weakens a firm’s ability to produce additional 
benefits from a subsequent positive action, placing “upper 
bounds on CSR contributions” (Barnett, 2007).
When a firm first decides to engage in CSR, it will likely 
invest in the more obvious and easier changes in terms of 
effort and money commitment, reaping quick benefits. It is 
often easier to enhance a firm’s CSR image when starting 
from a low base or with no prominent CSR presence. How-
ever, once a company has already developed a sound CSR 
reputation, it becomes increasingly difficult to grow or sus-
tain that reputation and to reap additional benefits through 
further actions (Sirsly & Lvina, 2019). Flammer (2013) pro-
vided evidence for diminishing marginal returns of environ-
mental CSR in the case of a new environmental initiative. 
We extend the same notion to the reputational capital created 
by overall positive prior CSR performance and test whether 
the diminishing returns effect holds when we evaluate mar-
ket reactions to the water subset of CSR actions. We build 
on Haack et al. (2014)‘s predictions of decreasing marginal 
effects for positive events until a threshold level of “taken-
for-grantedness” is reached. This implies a threshold or 
hurdle effect once a substantial level of past performance is 
reached and firms experience less market reward for further 
CSR actions. Therefore, we propose that firms that already 
have substantial records of prior positive CSR performance 
will be awarded less by the stock market as a result of one 
additional responsible action, and we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) Shareholders react less positively to a 
responsible water action by a firm with substantial presence 
of prior positive CSR performance than by a firm with no or 
minimal presence of prior positive CSR performance.
The biggest advantage of this reputational capital from 
positive CSR performance is that it functions like an insur-
ance cover by helping to preserve economic value (Shiu 
& Yang, 2017; Godfrey et al., 2009). Positive past perfor-
mance acts as a buffer and provides insurance-like protec-
tion against negative market reactions to the firm, in case 
the firm gets involved in a crisis or an irresponsible action. 
When a firm enjoys reputational capital from prior good 
CSR performance, shareholders can be expected to give the 
firm the benefit of the doubt in excusing the action and be 
more tolerant in their market reactions. Goodwill and posi-
tive perceptions about the firm encourage shareholders to 
see the company in a more favorable light and assess its 
subsequent negative action less severely (Godfrey, 2005).
Thus, Godfrey et al. (2009) proposed that in addition ̄ to 
the commonly argued wealth creation features, CSR also 
possesses wealth protective features in case of a negative 
event. Along similar lines, Shui and Yang (2017) provided 
empirical evidence that CSR performance offers insurance-
like effects on stock and bond prices of firms at times of 
negative events. Ducassy (2013) established the same CSR 
insurance protection in times of financial crisis in the econ-
omy. Minor and Morgan (2011) and Peloza (2006) theorized 
that CSR performance insures firms against loss of reputa-
tion in case of an adverse event, and compared the costs 
of CSR incurred by a firm to insurance premiums paid to 
avoid or minimize future loss potential. Bhattacharya and 
Sen (2004) argued CSR performance builds a reservoir of 
goodwill that can be drawn upon in times of crisis.
As in the case of positive CSR performance above, we 
extend these arguments to propose a threshold effect of 
responsible past performance. We do not expect sharehold-
ers to be able to differentiate fine gradations of reputation 
in forgiving new irresponsible actions. However, markets 
do notice as long as there is some record of past good per-
formance, and offer insurance-like benefits to these good 
performers but not to firms largely disengaged from CSR 
issues. More specifically, we test the insurance-like protec-
tion offered by noticeable presence of overall CSR past per-
formance in the context of the firm committing a subsequent 
irresponsible water action:
Hypothesis 4 (H4) Shareholders react less negatively to an 
irresponsible water action by a firm with presence of sub-
stantial prior positive CSR performance than by a firm with 
no or minimal presence of prior positive CSR performance.
Prior Corporate Socially Irresponsible (CSiR) Performance
Prior CSiR performance can give rise to negative reputation. 
Several studies have shown that firms with prior records of 
CSiR engage in subsequent good CSR action to discharge a 
reputational liability (Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Muller and 
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Kräussl, 2011; Cho et al., 2006; Konar & Cohen, 1997). For 
example, if a firm becomes embroiled in a negative contro-
versy or is featured in negative news like an oil spill in the 
recent past, the firm would have a direct impetus to change 
its corporate behavior in the immediate future, and share-
holders would value that action more than if it seemed to 
have come out of nowhere (Alakent & Ozer, 2014; Kruger, 
2015). Kruger (2015) described this as an “offsetting effect”, 
whereby shareholders reward positive CSR actions more 
when they see the actions coming from firms with prior 
records of CSiR. Coming from previous wrongdoers, these 
actions pleasantly surprise shareholders and they are more 
encouraging in their market reactions. Shareholders can be 
expected to interpret such changes as a direct indication of 
performance improvement and an effort to compensate for 
previous CSiR performance (Alakent & Ozer, 2014). As a 
result, shareholders react more positively than they would 
have had there been no direct reason for the firm to engage 
in the CSR action. This leads to our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 (H5) Shareholders react more positively to a 
responsible water action by a firm with substantial presence 
of prior negative CSR performance  than by a firm with no 
or minimal presence of prior negative CSR performance.
Contrary to this offsetting effect, when firms with sub-
stantial CSiR performance engage in one more irresponsible 
action, shareholders can be expected to be less surprised 
than they would be in the case of firms with no or minimal 
CSiR performance. Along the same principles for dimin-
ishing marginal positive returns, we propose a diminishing 
marginal negative returns phenomenon in this case. Each 
additional irresponsible action adds to the existing burden of 
the firm’s reputational liability, but the increase in liability 
can be expected to slow down with incremental irresponsible 
actions. As the market slowly gets indifferent to the irre-
sponsibility by these firms, subsequent irresponsible actions 
stimulate less severe negative market reaction. This echoes 
theories by Barnett (2014), who argued that stakeholders 
may not consistently punish irresponsible actions by firms 
because of various cognitive factors. One such important 
cognitive factor is expectations by shareholders set by the 
image or reputation of the firm (Burgoon and LaPoire, 1993; 
Love & Kraatz, 2017). Since, shareholders already see firms 
with prior CSiR performance in a negative light and expect 
less out of them, subsequent irresponsible actions by these 
firms simply conform with the previous expectations and 
create less surprise and stir in the market, resulting in milder 
market reactions (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). Therefore, we 
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6 (H6) Shareholders react less negatively to an 
irresponsible water action by a firm with substantial pres-
ence of prior negative CSR performance  than by a firm with 
no or minimal presence of prior negative CSR performance .
Data and Methodology
Sample Construction
Our sample event construction is based on the S&P 500 
firms during the period 2005–2017. We manually collected 
water-related news articles over the sample period from 
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and The Financial Times 
(FT), accessed through FACTIVA. The S&P 500 firms 
are the largest and the most prominent listed firms in the 
economy, and the two newspapers selected are among the 
topmost media in international business. This ensured we 
got maximum coverage of credible and significant public 
announcements of corporate water actions and related new 
information. In our search on FACTIVA, we used the follow-
ing set of carefully selected keywords: “flood”, “drought”, 
“oil spill”, “hazardous waste”, “toxic”, “radiation”, when 
the words appeared in the same paragraph as water; “con-
tamination”, “pollution”, “recycling”, “treatment”, “pres-
ervation”, “reduction”, “consumption”, “scarcity”, “short-
age”, “usage”, “efficiency”, “waste”, and “savings”, when 
the words appear within three-word-distance of “water”; 
“safe water”, “fresh water”, “clean water”, and “used water”, 
when the words appear anywhere in the article. We also 
considered basic variations for all keywords. For example, 
for “pollution”, we use the command “pollut*” in FACTIVA 
to search for any variations of the word like “polluted”, 
“pollute(s)”, etc. When articles referred to an earlier date or 
event that might have been featured in some other source, 
we recorded that too, in case the previous article could be 
traced and accessed.
We retained only those CSR/CSiR actions by firms that 
involved some impact on water resources. The actions gener-
ated through our search can be broadly classified into three 
groups:
– Water usage and savings, including, but not limited to, 
product- or process-related water efficiency/inefficiency 
and water saving/depletion.
– Contribution to, or refraining from, water pollution/
contamination, like cases of oil spill, toxic/hazardous 
waste disposal, etc.
– Charity or voluntary actions, with regard to the pro-
vision of clean water, cleansing of water bodies, water 
treatment and recycling, or participation in other water-
related issues.
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Our search generated an initial sample of 497 sample 
events from 120 companies. Each of these events and asso-
ciated news articles were further screened at three levels. 
First, we removed articles with confounding messages, for 
example, if an article contained a mix of both positive and 
negative messages, or the article also talked about other 
aspects like financial performance or acquisition. Second, we 
excluded articles which were repeat mentions or follow-ups 
of a previous event already included in our sample, unless 
there was substantial new information. Third, we omitted 
events involving firms for which CSR data or firm-level data 
were not available through Compustat. All three research-
ers screened and coded the events independently, and only 
events with 100% intercoder agreement were finally included 
in the sample. We had a final sample of 349 events, 168 of 
which were responsible and 181 irresponsible. Examples of 
some responsible and irresponsible events from our sample 
are provided in the Appendix 1 for illustration.
Table 2 reports the sample distribution by year and by 
industry. Year 2007 has the highest count of responsible 
water events and year 2010 has the highest peak of irre-
sponsible events. Certain years like 2010, 2011, 2014, and 
2015 have high concentration of water events in general. 
Overall, we have a good representation of both responsible 
and irresponsible events across all years from 2005 to 2017. 
When we segregate our sample events by industry (Panel B, 
Table 2), the top three industries with the highest incidence 
of water events are Oil & Gas, Food & Kindred Products, 
and Petroleum & Coal Products, due to the nature of the 
industries. Our sample events span over 35 broad industry 
types, top ten of which are reported with detailed numbers 
Table 2  Sample description
Panel A: Corporate water events by year
Year All events Responsible events Irresponsible events
Freq % Freq % Freq %
 2005 18 5.16 10 5.95 8 4.42
 2006 18 5.16 9 5.36 9 4.97
 2007 30 8.60 21 12.50 9 4.97
 2008 24 6.88 14 8.33 10 5.52
 2009 22 6.30 14 8.33 8 4.42
 2010 40 11.46 19 11.31 21 11.60
 2011 41 11.75 14 8.33 27 14.92
 2012 24 6.88 12 7.14 12 6.63
 2013 19 5.44 4 2.38 15 8.29
 2014 35 10.03 19 11.31 16 8.84
 2015 38 10.89 21 12.50 17 9.39
 2016 25 7.16 8 4.76 17 9.39
 2017 15 4.30 3 1.79 12 6.63
 Total 349 100 168 100 181 100
Panel B: Corporate water events by 2-digit SIC industry (all events)
2-digit SIC SIC Industry Freq %
 13 Oil & gas extraction 73 20.92
 20 Food & kindred products 61 17.48
 29 Petroleum & coal products 38 10.89
 99 Non-classifiable establishments 35 10.03
 28 Chemical & allied products 25 7.16
 53 General merchandise stores 17 4.87
 73 Business services 14 4.01
 49 Electric, gas, & sanitary services 14 4.01
 58 Eating & drinking places 9 2.58
 36 Electronic & electrical equipment 7 2.01
Others 56 16.05
Total 349 100
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in Table 2, indicating a good representation of water events 
across a wide range of industries.
Dependent Variable
We used standard event study methodology (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997) to estimate the market reaction to new infor-
mation of responsible/irresponsible corporate water actions, 
and the main dependent variable of interest is cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) following an event. We identify an 
event date as the day a news article containing new infor-
mation about a corporate water action is first published and 
brought to public notice. We calculated abnormal returns 










 , where R
it
 is 
firm i’s return on day t, and R
mt
 is the CRSP equal-weighted 




 are market model parameters, 
which were estimated using estimation period of 255 trading 
days ending 46 days before the event date, and with at least 
100 daily returns available during the estimation period. 
We used a 3-day window to calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding an event date and reported the 3-day 
CAR (− 1, 1) in our main empirical models. Both a shorter 
window (− 1, 0) and a longer window (− 2, 2) were also used 
for robustness checks and produced qualitatively the same 
results. Since the CAR is a market-based measure of abnor-
mal returns to firms’ water actions, it effectively provides 
empirical evidence of forward-looking perception of share-
holders. Furthermore, as the dependent variable of interest, 
CAR is much less subject to endogeneity concerns when we 
explore the moderating effects of prior general CSR perfor-
mance to water action-triggered financial impacts (Flammer, 
2013; Masulis & Reza, 2015).
Independent Variables
Prior CSR and CSiR Performance Measures
In order to test Hypotheses 2 to 5, the independent vari-
ables needed to be reasonable measures of prior CSR and 
CSiR performance by a firm. In order to determine the level 
of CSR and CSiR performance, we used KLD ESG data 
by MSCI—a data set with annual snap-shots of the envi-
ronmental, social, and governance performance of publicly 
listed US firms, and one of the most widely used sources 
of CSR data in current research (Cheng et al., 2014; Flam-
mer, 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Kruger, 2015, etc.). KLD 
STATS assigns scores against CSR performance of firms 
across seven key ESG stakeholder domains: community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, envi-
ronment, human rights, and product. Under each of these 
domains, there are multiple indicators of CSR strengths and 
concerns, specified separately, against which KLD STATS 
issues a binary score. Good/bad actions are recorded as “1” 
representing the presence of a strength/concern and “0” indi-
cate the absence of an action. Summing up total strengths 
and total concerns across all seven CSR domains provides 
composite scores for aggregate CSR strength and concern.
The total yearly strength and concern scores, therefore, 
act as good proxies for representing positive and negative 
CSR performance by a firm on an annual basis. The advan-
tage of using KLD data is that it recognizes that the same 
firm might be having good performance and reputation in 
some CSR issue areas and bad in others simultaneously, and 
provides parallel strength and concern scores. We used a one 
year lag for these variables to capture prior performance 
because the immediate past scores are likely to form the lat-
est and most relevant reputational image that the investors 
carry in their minds. It also avoids complications induced by 
CSR performance in the year of the focal event.
While differentiating between firms in terms of CSR/
CSiR performance, we used high-low dummies for both 
strength (indicating CSR performance) and concern 
(indicating CSiR performance) based on a cutoff point of 
1. A strength and concern score of more than 1 indicate 
considerable presence of positive and negative CSR per-
formance, respectively. A similar approach to measuring 
CSR with a hurdle effect cutoff has been applied in existing 
studies (Godfrey et al., 2009; Kruger, 2015). The relation-
ship between CSR and financial performance is not linear 
(Barnett & Salomon, 2012), and Giese and Nagy (2018) 
showed that the market reacted most intensely to new posi-
tive or negative information for companies that did not have 
extreme CSR scores. Therefore, beyond a threshold, the 
magnitude of the strength or concern scores often becomes 
irrelevant or less significant in influencing market reactions.
We used a cutoff score of 1, identifying firms with 
strengths and concerns of more than 1 as high strength and 
high concern groups, respectively, and those with no or 
minimal (just 1) strengths and concerns as the low group 
counterparts. We checked that none of the firm-years in our 
sample have had a single evaluation indicator in KLD CSR 
data. This strengthens our confidence that the construction 
of our key explanatory variable-high strength (dummy) and 
high concern (dummy)-is less likely to be affected by the 
possible drawback that some items across categories may 
no longer be reported after specific year. The high strength 
(dummy) and high concern (dummy) variables based on CSR 
strength and concern scores from the year before an event 
(1-year time lag) were the main independent variables used 
in our regression model.
1 We also calculated CAR using the Fama–French 3-factor model, 
and replaced the market model CAR with the Fama–French 3-factor 
model CAR for a robustness check. This robustness check leaves our 
results intact.
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As an additional test, we also used a continuous measure 
of water performance derived from Trucost water consump-
tion data and ran an auxiliary analysis using this measure. 
This helped us verify that when we measure performance 
from the specific field of water, the results are compatible 
with what we get for performance associated with general 
CSR. Trucost has been one of the leading sources for water 
consumption data starting from 2005. It currently covers 
about 93% of global markets by capitalization and is widely 
used by investors and other stakeholders (Trucost, 2015). 
However, Trucost does not provide strengths and concerns 
separately, and we could not form two separate independent 
variables for positive and negative performance, but rather 
had to use a single estimate based on water performance by 
firms for the auxiliary tests.
We used the water intensity ratio provided by Trucost on 
an annual basis. This is calculated by dividing water pro-
cessed and purchased by the revenue of a company and helps 
to neutralize any firm size effects and associated water use 
impacts. To further reduce the problem of size and type of 
industry on water consumption and to get rid of any yearly 
anomalies, we calculated how the water intensity ratio 
changed in the event preceding year over the year before 
that (before one year, over before two years, of an event). 
We used this percentage change in water intensity as our 
explanatory variable and termed it as water performance 
measure.
Control Variables
We controlled for a number of firm-level characteristics in 
our regression models, including Return on Equity (ROE), 
calculated by dividing net income by total equity; Lever-
age, calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets; 
Tobin’s q calculated as the sum of market capitalization and 
total liabilities divided by total assets; firm size (Size) by 
taking the natural logarithm of firm sales/revenue; Age, by 
taking the natural logarithm of number of years since the 
formation of the company; Number of Analysts by taking 
the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following 
the firm to understand the level of scrutiny the focal firm is 
under; and Recom Change by taking the average change in 
analyst recommendation that the focal firm experienced in 
the preceding month prior to an event. All variables were 
extracted from Compustat, except Number of Analysts which 
was obtained from Eikon by Thomson Reuters, and Recom 
Change which was taken from the IBES database. These 
firm-level controls were lagged by one year to reflect the 
company’s position prior to an event and to align with the 
timeframe for which the CSR performance scores were 
taken. As for the Recom Change variable, the most recent 
data from the month preceding an event were used for maxi-
mum relevance. We also included controls for time trend and 
industry fixed effects, and their interaction. The time vari-
able represented the year in which the event took place and 
industry was captured at the 2-digit SIC code level available 
through Compustat.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation 
for all dependent, independent, and control variables. All 
variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
All correlation coefficients are low to moderate, limiting 
potential concern about multicollinearity for our regression 
model.
Regression Model
In order to test the effects of prior CSR/CSiR performance 
on market reaction to a water event, we used the following 
regression model:
where i indexes corporate water events, and CAR i repre-
sents cumulative abnormal returns to the focal firm over the 
3-day window surrounding the event; α is the constant, β 
and γ are the two coefficients of interest against our two 
main independent variables, with the high strength dummy 
representing presence of CSR performance and high con-
cern dummy representing presence of CSiR performance. 
Controls is a vector of firm-level characteristics and other 
controlled effects, and ε is the error term. We used ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression and clustered error variance 
at the 2-digit SIC industry level.
To determine the past performance effects of water per-
formance in particular, we used the same regression specifi-
cation, replacing the high strength dummy and high concern 
dummy of overall CSR performance with the water perfor-
mance measure derived from Trucost water data.
Results and Findings
Stock Market Reaction to Water Events
In order to test H1 and H2 we analyzed the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) following responsible and irre-
sponsible water events over different CAR calculation win-
dows. The results are shown in Table 4. The mean CAR is 
significantly positive for responsible events over all three 
reported windows, summing to 0.35% (p-value = 0.037) over 
the 3-day window. Similarly, the mean CAR is significantly 
negative for irresponsible events over all three reported 
windows, reaching − 0.613% (p-value = 0.001) over the 
3-day window. This provides evidence in favor of H1 and 
CAR
i
=  +  high strength dummy
i
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H2. There is also an indication that the negative reaction 
to irresponsible events is slightly stronger than the positive 
reaction to positive events.
Effects of CSR and CSiR Performance on Market 
Reaction
In order to test if the strength and concern dummies based 
on prior CSR performance show any substantial difference 
in CAR between the high and low groups, we next ran uni-
variate t-tests and investigated if the mean of the two groups 
vary significantly from zero, and also from each other. The 
results are shown in Table 5. In the case of responsible water 
events, the CAR for the high strength group is lower by 103 
basis points compared to low strength group. But when the 
high strength firms get involved in an irresponsible event, 
the prior high CSR strength provides them with insurance 
coverage, and they experience a smaller fall in share price of 
only 38 basis points, compared to the low strength firms who 
see a fall of 220 basis points. This difference of 181 basis 
points is highly significant (p-value = 0.0007).
In terms of market value, the average market capitaliza-
tion for firms in the responsible water event pool is around 
$141 billion, so a 1.03% difference in CAR translates to 
about $1.4 billion. This means, as a result of diminishing 
marginal returns, high CSR performance firms gain about 
$1.4 billion less than their low CSR performance counter-
parts. Similarly, given the average market capitalization of 
$115 billion for firms in irresponsible water event pool, a 
difference of 1.81% translates to a market value of about 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics and correlations
*Represents coeffcients with p values ≤ 0.05
Responsible events (N = 168)
Mean Std. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 1. CAR (− 1,1) 0.004 0.022 1
 2. Strength dummy 0.958 0.200  − 0.095 1
 3. Concern dummy 0.940 0.237 0.013 0.073 1
 4. ROE 0.221 0.171  − 0.177* 0.156*  − 0.022 1
 5. Leverage 0.595 0.179 0.054 0.170* 0.149 0.113 1
 6. Size (ln) 10.72 1.163  − 0.006 0.261* 0.251*  − 0.031 0.346* 1
 7. Age (ln) 4.337 0.668  − 0.118 0.119 0.197* 0.135 0.336* 0.301* 1
 8. Tobin’s Q 2.311 1.177  − 0.089 0.049  − 0.188* 0.450*  − 0.452*  − 0.405*  − 0.193* 1
 9. No. of Analysts(ln) 3.082 0.339 0.040 0.164*  − 0.055  − 0.187*  − 0.258* 0.004  − 0.349*  − 0.042 1
 10. Recom Change 0.113 0.815  − 0.023  − 0.044 0.066  − 0.082 0.049 0.041 0.073 0.012 0.042 1
Irresponsible events (N = 181)
 1. CAR (− 1,1)  − 0.006 0.024 1
 2. Strength dummy 0.873 0.334 0.248* 1
 3. Concern dummy 0.867 0.340 0.269* 0.487* 1
 4. ROE 0.134 0.357 0.070 0.313* 0.147* 1
 5. Leverage 0.560 0.146  − 0.024 0.014  − 0.103  − 0.256* 1
 6. Size (ln) 10.39 1.561 0.150* 0.528* 0.456* 0.287*  − 0.045 1
 7. Age (ln) 4.303 0.637 0.139 0.393* 0.380* 0.134  − 0.047 0.610* 1
 8. Tobin’s Q 2.012 0.942 0.024 0.008  − 0.097  − 0.045  − 0.030  − 0.133  − 0.133 1
 9. No. of Analysts(ln) 3.137 0.340  − 0.001 0.155*  − 0.066 0.031  − 0.231*  − 0.157*  − 0.236*  − 0.002 1
 10. Recom Change 0.083 0.836 0.061 0.098 0.117  − 0.066 0.169*  − 0.068  − 0.033 0.137 0.013 1
Table 4  Cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) in % over 
different windows
Two tailed sig: *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
Responsible events Irresponsible events
N Mean P-value Std. Dev N Mean P-Value Std. Dev
CAR (− 1,0) 168 0.291* 0.067 0.020 181  − 0.416*** 0.004 0.019
CAR (− 1,1) 168 0.352** 0.037 0.022 181  − 0.613*** 0.001 0.024
CAR (− 2,2) 168 0.496** 0.049 0.032 181  − 0.567** 0.028 0.034
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$2.10 billion, indicating the worth of insurance benefit 
enjoyed by high CSR performance firms compared to low 
CSR performance firms on an average.
For firms with high concern, when these firms engage 
in a subsequent responsible water action, they are signifi-
cantly rewarded by the market with a mean CAR of 36 basis 
points (p-value = 0.033). This means, in terms of market 
value, the firms with prior CSiR presence are rewarded by 
about an amount of $0.5 billion on average, as a result of 
their subsequent positive action. However, in case of an irre-
sponsible water event, both high concern and low concern 
firms receive significant negative market reaction. But the 
negative CAR for the high concern group is significantly 
lower than that of the low concern group by 193 basis points 
(p-value = 0.0003). This represents a market value impact of 
about $2.2 billion on average.
However, since we used a hurdle rate to get an indicator 
variable of CSR and CSiR presence, and most firms from 
our S&P sample had multiple counts of strengths and con-
cerns, the number in the high and low strength and concern 
groups are not very balanced. Therefore, we also used non-
parametric median tests to check if the results reiterate find-
ings based on mean values. The median column in Table 5 
reports these median values, along with p values for whether 
the median values significantly differ from zero. The median 
values are close to the mean values for all subgroups and 
bear similar levels of significance. The difference in median 
column also reports the same indication as carried by the 
difference in means, with significant difference between high 
strength and low strength median CARs (156 basis points; 
p-value = 0.004) and between high concern and low concern 
median CARs (223 basis points; p-value = 0.085) in case of 
irresponsible events. To further validate these indications 
from univariate analysis and to test H3, H4, H5 and H6, we 
next applied multivariate regression.
We regressed the 3-day CARs, from responsible and irre-
sponsible events separately, on our list of control variables 
and our two main dummies of interest. Table 6 shows our 
main regression results. For robustness, we report our mod-
els changing combinations of time and industry variables. In 
the first model, we control for only industry fixed effects by 
using industry dummies represented by 2-digit SIC indus-
try codes. In the second, we control for both industry and 
time fixed effects. Finally, the third model represents our full 
specification model, where we control for industry and time 
interaction as well as industry and time variables.
Table 6 shows that in the case of responsible events, the 
high strength group consistently experience lower CARs 
than the low strength group, and this difference is highly 
significant in all three models. In model 3, our full specifica-
tion model, the CAR for the high strength group is signifi-
cantly lower by 160 basis points (p-value = 0.044) compared 
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higher difference of 190 basis points and higher significance 
at 1% level of confidence. This provides support for H3 that 
presence of prior CSR performance exhibits diminishing 
marginal returns, and that the stock  market reacts less posi-
tively to a positive water initiative by the high strength group 
than it does for the low strength group. For irresponsible 
events, the CARs of the high strength group in all three mod-
els in Table 6 are significantly higher than their low strength 
counterparts. The difference amounts to 190 basis points 
in model 3 (p-value = 0.002) showing that the fall in share 
price is lower for the high strength group than for the low 
strength group. This provides evidence in favor of an insur-
ance effect of prior CSR performance as proposed in H4. In 
terms of market value, these CAR differences indicate the 
average worth of diminishing marginal returns effect to be 
about $2.25 billion, and insurance effect about $2.20 billion, 
in line with our univariate findings.
The high concern dummy shows that firms with presence 
of prior CSiR performance earn significantly more CAR 
from subsequent responsible water events. Though in model 
1 and model 2 for responsible events we only get direc-
tional results, in model 3 including the full specification, 
the positive coefficient of 250 basis points is significant at 
the 5% confidence level (p-value = 0.048). This significant 
positive coefficient indicates that the market reacts more 
positively to responsible water actions by the high con-
cern group compared to the low concern group, providing 
evidence for the offsetting effect specified in H5. Finally, 
when we turn to the high concern group in the case of irre-
sponsible events, we see that they experience a lower fall in 
CARs than the low concern group, as indicated in all three 
models. In model 3 this difference is shown to be about 100 
basis points (p-value = 0.051). But both model 1 and 2 report 
higher magnitude of difference of 160 basis points, both sig-
nificant at 1% level of confidence. Therefore, we have evi-
dence in favor of the diminishing marginal negative returns 
effect resulting from market indifference, as hypothesized in 
H6. In terms of market value, these CAR differences indicate 
the average worth of offsetting effect to be about $3.5 billion, 
and diminishing marginal negative returns effect about $1.04 
billion, in line with our univariate findings.
Table 6̄  Impact of prior CSR performance on CARs (− 1,1)
P-values are in parentheses
Two tailed sig: *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
Responsible events Irresponsible events
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3










































































































Time trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time trend and industry 
effects
✓ ✓
Obs 168 168 168 181 181 181
R2 0.335 0.335 0.502 0.185 0.185 0.253
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Robustness
For robustness, we repeated our tests using CARs calcu-
lated over 5-day (− 2,2) and 2-day (− 1,0) windows. We 
also applied alternative methods of CAR calculation using 
value weighted market portfolio, and the Fama–French 
3-factor model. Our results remained qualitatively same 
under all scenarios. Another important concern could be 
that since we are using both strength and concern scores 
in the same model, it might sometimes give spurious 
results. We therefore, used a net score dummy, formed 
by deducting the concern score from the strength score 
and then identifying those with a net score of 1 or higher 
as the high group. We also used only strength and only 
concern once at a time in a model. These results reported 
in Table 7 give us a weaker picture of the proposed rela-
tionships since the models do not represent all variables 
and specifications. But this helps illustrate that even 
without the full specifications, the offsetting, insurance, 
and diminishing negative return effects all come out 
significant (p values of 0.057, 0.001, and 0.014, respec-
tively). Though diminishing positive returns marginally 
loses significance (p-value = 0.117), the direction of the 
result maintains. The net score dummy maintains indica-
tion of the insurance effect, with the high net score group 
realizing higher CAR (50 basis points, p-value = 0.032) 
in the case of irresponsible events. Although the net score 
model does not provide any significant results for respon-
sible events, it does not also show anything contradictory 
to our proposed effects. If we use continuous variables 
of strength and concern to replace the dummy variables, 
the results lose significance, except diminishing marginal 
returns (H3). However, this does not contradict to our 
findings, as we hypothesize hurdle effects rather than 
continuous effects.
Table 7  Robustness checks using different combinations of explanatory variables
P-values are in parentheses
Two tailed sig: *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01
Responsible events Irresponsible events
Model 1: net score Model 2: only 
strength
Model 3: only 
concern
Model 1: net score Model 2: only 
strength






































































































Time trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time trend and 
industry effects
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Obs 168 168 168 181 181 181
R2 0.480 0.483 0.497 0.224 0.247 0.233
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A remaining concern is that KLD ESG dataset already 
includes water issues under its ENV categories. In addi-
tion, several items under strength and concern of ENV 
categories are directly related to firms’ actions to water 
issues. This might cause the problem that our key explan-
atory variables are not clearly separate from research 
contexts. Therefore, for robustness, we excluded all the 
water parameters in calculating our CSR score from KLD 
and repeated our tests with this truncated measure. Our 
reported findings maintain, except the offsetting effect 
loses significance.
Results Using Trucost Water Performance Measures
We also carried out tests using water consumption data from 
Trucost to check if prior performance in the specific field of 
water creates reputational effects compatible with the find-
ings on general CSR strengths and concerns. Since Trucost 
data do not provide separate indications of strengths and 
concerns, we used a single continuous measure of water per-
formance and checked if that has any connection with the 
way the market reacts to a subsequent water action. Table 8 
shows our regression results using the 3-day CAR as the 
dependent variable and the water performance measure from 
Trucost as the main independent variable. The number of 
observations is different than in the KLD model because 
some firm-years that were included in our previous analysis 
had missing data for Trucost.
The results show that the higher the water performance 
measure (better water performance), the lower is the CAR 
from a responsible water event. Model 1 and 2 provide direc-
tional indication of this, while model 3 with full specifica-
tion of the industry and time variables shows that the nega-
tive coefficient of − 0.011 is significant with a p-value of 
0.027. This indicates that the diminishing marginal return 
effect is strongly evident even when we look at a firm’s spe-
cific performance and reputation in the field of water and 
on a continuous rather than a hurdle basis. In the case of 
irresponsible events, the insurance effect is strongly evident 
and significant in all 3 models. The higher the water per-
formance measure (better water performance), the higher is 
the CAR (less fall in share price), by about 90 basis points 
(p-value = 0.016 in model 3).
Table 8  Impact of prior water performance on CARs
P-values are in parentheses
Two tailed sig: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Responsible events Irresponsible events































































Tobin’s Q  − 0.001 
(0.769)
 − 0.001 
(0.797)
 − 0.001 
(0.809)
 − 0.003 
(0.542)




























Time trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Industry effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Time trend and industry 
effects
✓ ✓
Obs 149 149 149 162 162 162
R2 0.220 0.221 0.414 0.133 0.134 0.228
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Discussion
Although prior research has used event study methodologies 
to explore the market reaction to CSR events in different 
contexts, ours is the first study that investigates the market 
reactions in the new business ethics context of corporate 
water actions. Water demands exclusive research attention 
as a scarce, irreplaceable, and underpriced natural resource, 
representing rising concerns for sustainability in both the 
natural and business world. Despite growing awareness 
among all stakeholders about the ethical and allocative 
implications of business water usage and other corporate 
water actions, there is still a long way to go to give water 
its due worth, and corporate water actions remain an under-
researched field. Our empirical work helps by exploring and 
quantifying the financial impact of corporate water actions in 
a large sample setting. Our findings should encourage busi-
ness organizations to pay more attention to responsible water 
actions and also aid understanding of how water is a finan-
cial as well as a material and ethical issue for large firms.
We analyze manually constructed sets of responsible and 
irresponsible water actions and test stock market reactions. 
Our findings show that the market reacts positively to a 
responsible water action (CSR), and negatively to an irre-
sponsible water action (CSiR). This demonstrates that, just 
like any other aspects of CSR, water deserves to be consid-
ered and incorporated in the CSR strategies of organizations 
in its own right. This is not only because of the moral impli-
cations, but also because it can offer strategic and financial 
advantages and carry value for shareholders as reflected in 
the stock market. This finding suggests that firms should be 
more aware of their water actions, engaging more responsi-
bly and reporting their positive actions through more trans-
parent reporting and disclosure. 
Another important contribution of our paper is that we 
capture the theoretical distinction between CSR performance 
and actions, and show that market reactions to water-based 
CSR/CSiR actions bear strong relationships with prior over-
all CSR and CSiR performance by firms. We explain these 
associations in terms of positive and negative reputation 
built from the prior CSR and CSiR performance by firms. 
These associations help to show that effects of general CSR/
CSiR performance reputation extends to water issues, and 
that the financial impacts of water actions should be inter-
preted in relation with the broader context of overall firm 
CSR and CSiR performance.
Most related research has concentrated on the creation 
of reputational capital from prior good CSR performance 
and its effects for subsequent events from specific areas. 
However, we point out that prior negative CSR (CSiR) 
performance could create reputational liability that is a sepa-
rate and independent construct from reputational capital. We 
devise a two-by-two matrix proposing four distinct effects 
of past responsible and irresponsible performance on market 
reaction in the context of water actions. Our analysis shows 
favorable evidence for all four proposed effects: diminishing 
positive marginal returns and an insurance effect for past 
responsibility; and diminishing negative marginal returns 
and an offsetting effect for past irresponsibility. Our findings 
support previous studies like Flammer (2013), Godfrey et al. 
(2009) and Kruger (2015), which have provided evidence in 
favor of diminishing marginal returns, insurance, and offset-
ting, respectively, from varying areas of CSR. However, our 
contribution is unique because we provide empirical support 
for the complete grid of all four effects shown in Table 1 in 
a single study, focusing on events from the under-explored 
ethical domain of corporate water actions. This adds more 
uniformity to the results, from one of the most under-
researched areas of CSR. Our study is also unique in explor-
ing the overall effects of general past CSR performance as a 
composite measure. In her 2013 paper, Flammer mentioned 
that one of the main directions for future research could be 
to investigate if the diminishing marginal returns, which her 
paper demonstrated for environmental CSR, applies to CSR 
in general. We answer this call, by investigating the impact 
of aggregate past performance arising out of all kinds of 
CSR, and exploring if this prior CSR influences market reac-
tions in the niche context of corporate water actions.
We find these effects of prior CSR/CSiR performance 
on market reactions to be very strong and robust. Even 
when we narrow down our scope and definition of prior 
performance to the specific field of water, and use specific 
water consumption data from Trucost as a measure of water 
performance, we obtain similar results as proposed in our 
matrix. Given the continuous nature of this measure, we 
are able to construct a continuous score for corporate water 
performance. With this narrower scope (water performance 
only) but more precise (continuous span data) measure of 
performance, we get strong evidence in favor of both the 
diminishing positive marginal returns and insurance effects. 
This suggests that whether we measure performance broadly 
at general CSR level or from the specific domain of water 
actions, our proposed reputational effects are equally appli-
cable in both scenarios.
Implications of the Findings
Our findings have both theoretical and practical implica-
tions. First and foremost, our study informs researchers 
and practitioners about the shareholder wealth effects of 
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corporate water actions. These impacts should motivate 
business organizations to drive responsible water actions, 
and avoid irresponsible water actions simultaneously. Sec-
ondly, our study demonstrates that the shareholder wealth 
effects of water actions are associated with the broader con-
text of overall firm CSR and CSiR performance. In studying 
the influence of prior CSR/CSiR performance, this paper 
contributes to the strategic CSR literature, adding new per-
spectives to theories positioning CSR as a source of com-
petitive advantage and reputational capital. We extend these 
theories by proposing that prior negative CSR performance 
(CSiR) can similarly act as a strategic disadvantage and rep-
utational liability. In case of any subsequent positive action 
by the firm, CSR reputational capital and CSiR reputational 
liability independently affect the way market reacts to the 
action, and both factors need to be built in together for a 
comprehensive analysis of effects. From a practical perspec-
tive, our study emphasizes the incentives for firms to balance 
between doing good actions and avoiding bad actions.
Although firms with prior CSR performance earn returns 
at a lower rate from a subsequent responsible action than 
firms with no notable presence of prior CSR performance, 
the returns are positive for both groups. That is, all firms 
benefit on average from responsible water actions, but the 
market develops more expectations from the high perform-
ers and provides greater incentives to the low performers to 
engage in good actions. As good CSR performance raises 
the bar, firms need to maintain and build on their good prac-
tices to maintain legitimacy and meet expectations (Mishina 
et al., 2010). This is a particularly striking finding in the 
current context where expectations of CSR are increasing, 
gradually decreasing the value of the status quo (Barnett, 
2007). More importantly, firms that keep doing good deeds 
keep accumulating additional buffers for a rainy day. In case 
the firm makes a mistake, or faces a crisis, the market can 
be expected to provide value protection or insurance-like 
benefits, and react less negatively to the event, as reward for 
the firm’s prior good performance.
As for firms with notable presence of prior irresponsibil-
ity, corporate leaders should not feel demotivated to engage 
in a subsequent good action or think that the market will not 
be responsive enough in case they do. Rather, the market 
reacts more positively as encouragement to this group when 
they do something responsible, which we term an offsetting 
effect. In the case of a subsequent irresponsible action, firms 
that already have records of prior CSiR performance, expe-
rience less negative market reactions compared with their 
counterparts. This is an extension of the same diminishing 
returns principle that is experienced with positive past per-
formance and subsequent responsible actions. The market 
holds higher expectations from firms without prior CSiR 
performance records, and grows somewhat indifferent to the 
subsequent bad actions of poor performers with prior CSiR.
A key theoretical nuance in our study is that all the 
effects that we propose are non-continuous in nature and 
are connected with hurdle rates as the general relationship 
between CSR and CFP is non-linear in nature (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2012). Especially, in the case of both the offset-
ting and diminishing negative marginal returns, the effects 
of prior CSiR performance are strictly proposed for marginal 
defaulters. Since reputational liability is sticky and more dif-
ficult to overcome than positive reputation (Sirsly & Lvina, 
2019; Zavyalova et al., 2017), if the CSiR performance and 
associated negative reputation get too high, it might rather 
generate a sense of distrust among shareholders and hamper 
the firm’s credibility. Regarding offsetting effect, the posi-
tive market reaction represents market encouragement pro-
vided to marginal CSiR performers to engage in subsequent 
positive actions. Regarding diminishing negative marginal 
returns, if the firms keep continuing the CSiR performance, 
at some stage the shareholders may likely give up on these 
firms and rather start penalizing them at an increasing rate 
(Haack et al., 2014; Zavyalova et al., 2017). The practical 
implication from this theoretical extension is to highlight 
incentives for firms to avoid repeated bad or irresponsible 
deeds.
Limitations and Scope for Future Research
Our study has its own limitations. First of all, we have not 
explored the long-run financial impact of corporate water 
actions. Investigating either long-run abnormal returns to 
corporate water actions, or commonly used long-term firm 
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performance measures like return on assets, free cash flow, 
Tobin’s Q, etc., in the context of corporate water actions, 
could prove to be interesting avenues for future research. 
Secondly, our sample was limited to those S&P 500 listed 
companies mentioned in water news articles. Future research 
including smaller and/or private firms could further explore 
whether the effects we reported is generalizable to less 
publicly visible firms. Third, we only tested the two-by-
two matrix of CSR and CSiR performance in the context 
of corporate water actions. Future research could explore 
the empirical implications of this matrix in a wider span of 
CSR areas, separately or on an aggregate level. Finally, and 
most importantly, although our study sheds indirect light on 
the value of water actions to shareholders, we acknowledge 
that the value of water is far broader in ethical and allocative 
terms than stock market reactions.
Conclusion
Contemporary trends such as climate change, urbaniza-
tion, population growth, and a surge in industrial and 
economic activities, have continued to exacerbate various 
water-related problems. Water underpins human health, 
natural habitats, and socio-economic systems, but is rou-
tinely not considered or valued appropriately in the cur-
rent economic system. Our study is the first to establish 
that stock markets react to corporate water actions. We 
find that responsibility toward water issues is rewarded and 
that irresponsibility is noticed and punished in the financial 
market. Past CSR and CSiR performance influence market 
reactions when firms undertake subsequent responsible 
or irresponsible water actions. Our findings are useful to 
future researchers, suggesting new research directions and 
focus for studies on corporate water actions specifically 
and CSR more broadly. They also serve as a call to arms 
for corporate leaders and policy-makers to more fully value 
this traditionally undervalued resource.
Appendix 1
See Table 9
Table 9  Examples of sample events
Company name News date Featured water issues
Responsible water actions
 IBM 25-Apr-07 IBM helps bid to protect important river systems
 Chesapeake Energy Corp 19-Nov-12 Drillers begin reusing ‘frack water’
 Johnson and Johnson 21-Mar-13 Helping to preserve New Jersey’s Raritan River
 e-Bay 8-Sep-14 Firms avoid drought effects – air-cooled computer servers, low-flow toilets conserve water on west 
coast
 Conoco Phillips 27-Oct-14 Oil sands group commits to cutting environmental impact; COSIA commits to reducing fresh water 
use at some operations
 Microsoft 24-Jun-15 High tech rethinks water use for cooling—harvesting rainwater is one alternative
 Coca Cola 29-Aug-16 Coca Cola and its bottling partners meet 2020 water replenishment goal five years early
Irresponsible water actions
 Pulte Homes Inc 12-Jun-08 Feds fine homebuilders for water pollution
 General Electric 18-Dec-10 EPA Presses GE on Cleanup of River
 Baker Hughes Inc 1-Feb-11 Energy companies faulted on fracturing
 Apple Inc 1-Sep-11 Apple faces environmental criticism in China over supplier plants
 Anadarko Petroleum Corp 23-Feb-12 Judge rules BP, Anadarko Liable in Gulf Spill
 Tesoro Logistics 10-Oct-13 Tesoro logistics pipeline spills 20,000 barrels in North Dakota; accident appears to be the largest to 
date in Bakken Shale Formation
 Coca Cola 19-Jun-14 Water shortage shutters Coke plant in India
 Berkshire Hathaway Inc 22-Jul-16 Berkshire Hathaway utility, others to clean up coal plant waste
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